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The End of Religious Freedom:
What is at Stake?
Nelson Tebbe*

Warnings can be heard today that the American tradition of religious
freedom is newly imperiled and may even be nearing exhaustion. Steven
Smith is an eloquent and accomplished herald of that development,1 and his
warnings have been echoed by other distinguished authors.2 They worry that
we are seeing an unprecedented attack on the very idea of constitutional
protections for religion.3 Although conflicts between secularism and
religion are nothing new, this critique is thought to be both more
fundamental—because it targets not just particular applications of religious
freedom but the notion itself—and more likely to succeed. Religious
freedom as a constitutional concept is thought to be at risk.
Three distinct concerns combine to produce this worry, in my view.
First, there is the argument that religion is not special—that it should not
draw constitutional protection different from the guarantees extended to
other commitments of conscience.4 If religion is not special, then religious
freedom as a distinct right could be lost, even if religious actors continue to
be protected under other provisions ensuring liberty and equality. Second is
the concern that a coherent or rational theory of religious freedom cannot be
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 (2014) [hereinafter Smith,
The Last Chapter]; STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
11 (2014).
2. See generally, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304427; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011) [hereinafter Laycock, Sex, Atheism].
3. See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 407, 411; Smith, The Last Chapter, supra note
1, at 903–04.
4. See Smith, supra note 1, at 903-05 (describing Noah Feldman’s argument that religious
freedom should not receive special constitutional solicitude).
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found.5 Courts interpret and apply the free exercise and nonestablishment
provisions in ways that are incoherent, and unavoidably so. That poses a
threat to the future of religious freedom because it engenders instability and
vulnerability.6 Third, there is a sense that the culture wars are over and that
they have been won by the forces of secular liberalism.7 Evidence of that
conclusion is strongest in the area of LGBT rights, but it includes other
developments as well.8 A new egalitarian orthodoxy is seen to imperil the
rights of religious believers who now constitute an embattled minority in
need of counter-majoritarian protection. Yet the same developments that
make constitutional protections more necessary also threaten rights of
religious freedom, on this view.
In this short Response, I bracket the substance of debates over the health
of religious freedom doctrine and whether religion is special. Instead, I ask
what is at stake in them. In particular, I am interested in the consequences
not only for constitutional litigation, but also for legislation on related
issues, and for concrete political controversies that implicate constitutional
questions surrounding religious actors. What would change on the ground if
one side or the other were to prevail on questions such as whether religion is
constitutionally distinctive or whether the doctrine of religious freedom is
coherent?
My hypothesis will be that little of consequence turns on those debates
when it comes to ground-level legal disputes. In practice, if not in theory,
constitutional actors are committed to protecting religious citizens, and that
is unlikely to change fundamentally in the foreseeable future. Americans
also carry competing commitments to separation of church and state, to
fairness for nonreligious persons, to equality for sexual minorities, to
equality of opportunity for workers and other economic actors, and so forth.
Whether that complex of values gets conceptualized as religious freedom or
5. See, e.g., id. at 25 (noting “flagrant inconsistency” in the Court’s doctrines on religious
freedom and doubting whether it can be avoided).
6. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
7. See id. at 22 (describing a conflict between “traditional religion and the emerging egalitarian
orthodoxy”).
8. See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 412–19 (attributing recent attacks on religious
freedom to the LGBT movement and to the recent social salience of nonbelievers); Richard
Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage,
the “War On Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009, 2009–10 (2011)
(focusing on the LGBT movement and attacks on Islam after 9/11).
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not, and whether religion is thought to occupy a special place in the
constitutional order—those are questions that themselves will have little
bearing on practical outcomes.
That is not to say that low stakes equals no stakes.9 Undeniably, the
disputes themselves are important—people care deeply and rightly about
legislative prayer, the contraception mandate, exemptions from laws
protecting LGBT people, and so forth. My skepticism rather concerns how
much turns on whether we conceptualize these debates as questions of
religious freedom as opposed to broader constitutional concerns about
individual liberty and equal citizenship, and whether legal frameworks in the
area are comparatively clear and stable. Outcomes will depend more
directly on how less abstract commitments are managed in light of ongoing
social and political developments.
Furthermore, abstract legal and moral questions about the
distinctiveness of religion matter for their own sake, and they can influence
more practical matters (just as they are influenced by them). But that
influence typically is indirect.
Below, I first offer examples of cases where the specialness of religion
underdetermines its protection.10 Then, I examine disputes where courts
have been charged with incoherence or irrationality and I ask whether the
charge is accurate, what alternatives exist, and how much doctrinal
muddiness can undermine actual protection. Third, I consider the concern
with liberal orthodoxy. I assess the trope and I determine that it currently
functions as a warning rather than a diagnosis of inadequate protection for
religious freedom. I conclude the Response by agreeing with Steven Smith’s
prediction that religious actors’ success in legal disputes will depend most
centrally on their fortunes in broader social and political dynamics. Whether
constitutional decision-makers protect observance, in other words, will
likely follow more directly from the ability of traditional believers to
convince Americans that their causes are worthwhile than it will follow from
doctrinal niceties.
Elsewhere, I defend the view that complex commitments around

9. Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
305, 319–21 (2010) (arguing that debates over constitutional interpretation have “low stakes, not no
stakes”).
10. See infra notes 13–48 and accompanying text.
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religious freedom can be managed.11 Here, the argument is simply that
surprisingly few legal disputes would be affected by “the end of religious
freedom” as such.12 We should care about these debates, but we should care
about them because of their symbolic impact and moral importance, not
primarily because of constitutional outcomes on the ground.
***
A first concern voiced by Steven Smith and others is that religion may
lose its special status in the American constitutional order.13 Under the new
regime, religious actors would be protected, but only as holders of general
rights to free speech, due process, equal protection, etc., and only to the
extent that others are protected under those provisions. Not only would that
protection be indistinct, it would also be insufficient.14 Smith gives one
main example of a decision where religion is special and wins protection,
and one example where religion is elided and goes unprotected.15 Yet there
also are plenty of instances where religious actors win under general
provisions, and where they lose under specific protections, as I will explain
in this Section.16
Recall first Smith’s own examples. In Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, claims by religious actors were evaluated under the same free
speech doctrines that apply to everyone, and they were rejected.17 The Court
11. See Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127–30 (2011) [hereinafter Tebbe,
Nonbelievers] (adopting a polyvalent approach to problems of religious freedom).
12. See infra notes 101–12 and accompanying text.
13. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 904–05; Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note
2, at 39–40 (connecting the argument that religion is not constitutionally distinctive to other
developments and arguing that together they are “deeply threatening to the American tradition of
religious liberty”).
14. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 904 (suggesting that the end of religious
freedom would be “premature and deeply unfortunate”); id. at 905 (“[T]the regime of religious
freedom is currently in jeopardy.”). For Smith, protection will be insufficient without distinctive
guarantees for religion because laws passed by the liberal state will disproportionately impact
traditional religions. Cf. id. at 929 (“[E]qual treatment [in CLS v. Martinez] meant in reality that
religion can be burdened in ways that other sorts of commitments or interests will not be, because a
rule prohibiting associations from conditioning membership on religious belief obviously will have a
much more severe impact on churches or other religious associations than on other groups.”).
15. See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 17–48 and accompanying text.
17. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010). According to Smith, the CLS v. Martinez holding “seemed to
evince the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the . . . position . . . [that] religious individuals and
associations should enjoy the same protections that others enjoy . . . but religion should not be
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turned away a complaint that Hastings Law School had denied official
recognition to the Christian Legal Society (CLS) in violation of free speech
and free exercise rights.18 Law school administrators reasoned that the
organization violated the school’s “all-comers” policy by effectively
denying membership on the basis of religion and sexual orientation.19 The
Court treated the school’s program of recognizing student groups as a
limited public forum and it upheld the “all-comers” policy as reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.20 Evaluating religious actors on the same terms as others,
the Court turned away their challenge.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,21
conversely, the Court extended special constitutional solicitude to religion
and found in its favor.22 There, the Justices held that a Christian school
could dismiss a teacher even if antidiscrimination laws otherwise would
have protected her.23 The Court reasoned that because she counted as clergy,
the school had a constitutional right to dismiss her under the ministerial
exception doctrine.24 Rather than accept the invitation of the Solicitor
General to evaluate the case under the rule for expressive associations that
applies to everyone, the Court held unanimously that religion was special in
this regard—that the ministerial exception was grounded in the free exercise
and nonestablishment provisions of the First Amendment, which are
particular to religion.25 In this situation, finding that religion was special

singled out for special or differential protection.” Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 928.
18. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
19. Id. at 2980 (“CLS’s bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination
Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation.”). Actually, there was
a factual dispute about whether the school really did have an “all-comers” policy or whether it
prohibited discrimination only on specific grounds, including religion, but the majority found that
the parties had stipulated to an “all-comers” policy and analyzed the dispute accordingly. Id. at
2982–84.
20. Id. at 2984, 2995.
21. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
22. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 929–32 (discussing Hosanna-Tabor).
23. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
24. Id. at 708 (“we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception”);
id. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the First
Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious
employer.”).
25. Id. at 706 (calling “remarkable” the view that religious activity does not enjoy distinctive
constitutional treatment in this context).
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meant not only giving it distinctive constitutional treatment, but also giving
it greater protection, because the ministerial exception almost certainly is
more powerful than freedom of expressive association.26
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that extending distinctive
constitutional solicitude to religion necessarily means granting it stronger
protection against majoritarian regulation. In certain cases, the Court has
found in favor of religious actors using general provisions, and it has found
against them even while treating them specially.
Specialness
underdetermines constitutional protection, as it turns out.
In a long line of decisions, for instance, religious actors have deployed
general speech theories to win substantial victories against governments that
sought to exclude them from benefits.27 Interestingly, these equal access
cases involved a deliberate strategy by churches and prayer groups to
leverage the general language of individual rights—in particular, the
language of equality and antidiscrimination—this time on behalf of
traditional religious actors rather than against them.28 In decisions like
Rosenberger, Good News Club, and Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held that
public educational institutions could not single out religious actors for
exclusion once they opened their buildings and resources to a broad range of
other groups.29 In fact, the Court used the very same public forum doctrine
featured in CLS v. Martinez to find in favor of religious actors on the ground
that exclusion of their perspectives constituted prohibited viewpoint
discrimination.30
Likewise, general government speech doctrine has been deployed
26. See Tebbe, Nonbelievers, supra note 11, at 1146–47 (demonstrating that the ministerial
exception provides stronger protection than the general right to expressive association).
27. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
28. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 206–07 (2005) (describing religious actors’ strategy of deploying
antidiscrimination language and casting themselves as minorities).
29. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–12; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–37; Lamb’s Chapel,
508 U.S. at 391–97.
30. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–12 (“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded
from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.
Thus, we conclude that Milford's exclusion of the Club from use of the school, pursuant to its
community use policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”).
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effectively to preserve the integrity of majoritarian religious messaging. In
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, for instance, the Court concluded that a
town could erect a Ten Commandments monument in a public park without
being forced to also include a monument expressing the views of a minority
faith.31 Because the government was expressing its own views, it could
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.32 Although technically the decision
turned away a challenge by a minority faith, it reinforced an assumption that
a government could recognize majoritarian beliefs, including religious
ones.33
Other equality rules have similarly protected religious actors. In Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, Justice Kennedy reasoned
for the majority that a town could not discriminate against Santeria, a faith
that practiced animal sacrifice.34 Town lawmakers had passed an ordinance
banning animal killing, but it was riddled with so many exceptions that it
effectively targeted only Santeria practices.35 Justice Kennedy reasoned that
although religious groups could not claim special exemptions from general
laws under free exercise doctrine, they also were protected from
extraordinary government discrimination.36 Although it is possible to
understand the case as applying antidiscrimination protection only to
religious groups, an equally natural reading is that the decision enforced
equality by requiring the government to refrain from irrational

31. 555 U.S. 460, 464–67 (2009). Id. at 464–67.
32. Id. at 479–81.
33. See id. There was no Establishment Clause challenge to the Ten Commandments monument
before the Court. See id. at 466 (noting that the petitioners brought only a free speech claim).
Summum wanted both displays included, not both excluded, so it did not object to the existing
monument. See Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 95, 102 (2009) (noting that Summum did not bring an Establishment Clause claim),
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32
Meyler.pdf. Any such challenge probably would have failed under existing doctrine. See
Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 50–52 (2009), available at https://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/Colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf.
34. 508 U.S. 520, 523–24 (1993).
35. Id. at 535–38.
36. Id. at 532 (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at
issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons.”).
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discrimination.37
Not only has the Court extended significant protection to believers
under general constitutional principles like these, but also it has denied
protection to religious groups under special provisions.38 For several
decades—during the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, roughly—the Court purported to
extend free exercise protection to believers whose practices were
substantially burdened by general laws.39 Yet, as many commentators have
observed, religious actors rarely prevailed.40 Aside from unemployment
benefits cases like Sherbert v. Verner, free exercise claimants won only one
case, in which Amish parents sought to control their children’s educations
despite truancy laws.41 Otherwise, distinctive constitutional protection
proved useless in case after case.42
Establishment Clause cases are more difficult to assimilate to the model.
On the one hand, the Establishment Clause could be understood to treat
religion in a special way—but unfavorably. Consider Town of Greece v.
Galloway, the legislative prayer case that is pending before the Supreme
Court. When the lower court struck down the town’s prayer scheme, it
singled out one type of government speech for a prohibition that would not
have been imposed on any secular message.43 In the Establishment Clause
37. Cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 52 (2007) (arguing that although the Constitution should not treat religion with
special solicitude, it can and must protect religious actors from government “hostility and neglect”).
It is possible to think of the ban on discrimination on the basis of religion as grounded in equal
protection rather than the First Amendment. See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and
the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909,
911–20 (2013); Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and
Their History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 275 (2006).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
39. The leading case that articulated this approach is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963).
40. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111, 1127 (1990); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412 (1992) (“[T]he free
exercise claimant, both in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, rarely succeeded under the
compelling interest test.”).
41. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Lyng, at 485 U.S. at 448–49; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509–10; Lee, 455 U.S. at 259–
60.
43. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388
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area, in other words, special treatment for religion does not promote
religious freedom in any straightforward way.44
Outside the courts, similar mismatches are commonplace. Congress and
the Obama Administration have extended significant exemptions from the
contraception mandate only to religious groups,45 and yet those protections
fall short of what many religious actors demand.46 On the other hand, many
of the most significant and effective protections for religious individuals and
organizations are available generally, such as the tax exemption for
charitable nonprofits47 and exemptions for medical service providers who
object to contraception or abortion.48
My conclusion from these examples is that the end of religious freedom,
taken for now to mean the end of special constitutional solicitude, need not
entail weaker protection for religious actors. Rather, the relationship
between constitutional distinctiveness and constitutional protection is more
complicated. Whether individual believers and their organizations will win
particular disputes depends more on the application of lower-level
commitments, such as bans on viewpoint discrimination and principles of
expressive association, than on abstract debates over whether religion enjoys

(2013).
44. Of course, it is possible to argue that separationism does more to protect religious practice
than to stifle it. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698–99 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Moreover, I have recently argued that the prohibition on religious endorsement in government
speech is not as unusual as many people assume—many other types of government speech are in fact
restricted by constitutional principles. See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 648, 654–57 (2013) [hereinafter Tebbe, Nonendorsement]. I caution, however, that
limitations on government endorsement of religion continue to be distinctive in some respects. Id. at
711–12.
45. See, e.g., Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 123–25 (discussing the Obama
Administration’s rule on contraception).
46. See id. at 1 (arguing that the Obama Administration’s rules on contraception “offer very
substantial protection to religious institutions, and they are likely to satisfy most judges. Religious
institutions should claim victory or perhaps seek to negotiate minor adjustments” but noting that the
rules concerning for-profit employers present a closer case).
47. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (upholding a property tax
exemption that included land owned by religious organizations for religious worship).
48. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(b) (2000) (protecting the ability of medical providers who
receive public funds to refuse to perform, assist with, or make facilities available for, abortions if
doing so is contrary to “religious beliefs or moral convictions”); 45 C.F.R. § 88, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072,
2008 WL 9742178 (2008) (HHS final regulations implementing “federal healthcare conscience
protection statutes”).
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a unique place in American constitutionalism. Even more centrally, it
depends on political and social dynamics that I will discuss below. Much the
same can be said for the worry over incoherence or irrationality in religious
freedom decisions, as it turns out.
***
A second concern that contributes to the diagnosis of an end to religious
freedom is that court opinions and other constitutional decisions on the
subject are increasingly and irredeemably incoherent.49 That is largely
because the internal logic of religious freedom began historically with
theological justifications that slowly gave way to secular rationales. But
without its theological tenets, religious freedom lacked a coherent logic.
That paradox has led to a jurisprudence of religious freedom that is at war
with itself, that results in decisions that seem illogical without a theological
underpinning, and that therefore is vulnerable to attack and even
elimination.50
In other work, Smith has offered Kent Greenawalt’s writing as an
example of the troubled state of the dominant discourse on religious
freedom.51 Greenawalt maintains that plural values count in religion clause
jurisprudence, and that these values are not reducible to a master
commitment such as equality or separationism.52 But Smith thinks that
managing multiple secular values is not possible in religious freedom cases
without ultimate resort to reasoning that is conclusory or tantamount to ipse
dixitism.53 Greenawalt skillfully considers many arguments for and against a
particular outcome in a given scenario, but ultimately he simply chooses
among them without giving a rationale.54 Again, Smith thinks this type of
reasoning is not really the fault of Greenawalt, whose skill is beyond
49. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 925–26.
50. See id. at 911 (calling rationales for religious freedom “shaky” and “hardly . . . stable and
secure”); id. at 923 (suggesting that Supreme Court decisions in the area have been “notoriously
erratic (or, some might say, unprincipled)”; id. at 924 (diagnosing “flagrant inconsistency in
adhering to announced doctrines”).
51. See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1893 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Discourse] (reviewing 2 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS).
52. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
1–15 (2008).
53. See Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1905–06.
54. See id. at 1870–72.
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question, and more a symptom of the deep incoherence that characterizes
religious freedom discourse.55
But does resolving actual disputes really involve conclusoriness, or just
complexity? And if the latter, is there any available methodology that would
eliminate it? Consider some of Smith’s examples of places where reason
fails. Probably his leading exhibit is Greenawalt’s discussion of Good News
Club.56 One of the equal access cases, that decision required a school to
allow a Christian club for children to meet directly after school and in the
building just like other clubs and community groups.57 The Court found that
excluding religious groups constituted viewpoint discrimination and
therefore violated the Free Speech Clause.58 Greenawalt criticizes Good
News Club. He argues that it differs from earlier cases because it involved
young children who were more vulnerable to school endorsement of
religion, because Good News Club was an outside group that sought to
evangelize, and because the meetings took place immediately after school.59
Combined, these features made it reasonable for school officials to worry
that children would perceive official approval of the group, particularly if
their peers were attending in large numbers, and that children might be
unduly influenced to prevail on parents to allow them to join the club.60
Smith calls Greenawalt’s conclusion a “bald pronouncement[]”—or a
statement that “at least look[s] like” a bald pronouncement.61 It exemplifies
the conclusory reasoning that is symptomatic of the deteriorated state of
legal discourse on religious freedom.62 But is it really bankrupt? Not only
does Greenawalt offer reasons for his conclusion, but those reasons
implement his articulated commitments of principle.63 One of those is
55. See id. at 1905–06 (“Greenawalt's default on the level of justification is not so much an
individual failure. Rather, it is a reflection of the current condition of the tradition.”); see also id. at
1893 (softening his earlier indictment of Greenawalt’s prescriptions).
56. See id. at 1893. Elsewhere, I discuss Greenawalt’s treatment of this case in a different
context. Nelson Tebbe, Eclecticism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 318–19 (2008) [hereinafter Tebbe,
Eclecticism].
57. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001).
58. Id. at 107.
59. 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 206.
60. Id.
61. Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1893.
62. Id. at 1905–06.
63. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 6–13 (identifying and describing a group of basic
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concern for individual autonomy.64 Government violates that principle
whenever it interferes with individual choice around religion by influencing
individual choice in favor of a particular religion, all religion, or no
religion.65 Undue influence over young children could well frustrate that
value. Now, Greenawalt does not explicitly invoke a principle of individual
autonomy in his discussion of Good News Club,66 but its involvement is
impossible to miss, given the theoretical framework that he articulates at the
outset. So his conclusion is supported not only by reasons, but by principled
ones.
My point here is not that conclusoriness or contradiction are entirely
absent from religious freedom scholarship—it would be foolish to say that—
but rather that they may not be as common as suggested. There are other
examples for which the concern seems stronger. Take for instance Lee v.
Weisman, where the Court struck down a graduation prayer at a public high
school.67 Greenawalt thinks this is a difficult case because, on the one hand,
religious students and officials wish to dignify an important rite of passage
by invoking their deity while, on the other hand, dissenting members of the
school community may feel coerced into observance because attendance at
graduation is often understood to be mandatory.68 After making several
additional points, Greenawalt concludes that the Court probably was correct
to disallow the prayer out of concern for the principle that government may
not sponsor religion, but he expresses “regret” about that conclusion.69 In a
follow-up article, Greenawalt offers his analysis of Lee v. Weisman as an
example of genuine value conflict.70 He himself believes that in such cases
reasons run out—that all he can say to justify his judgment is that the
reasons supporting the Court’s decision seem to him to be stronger than the
reasons cutting against it.71

Establishment Clause values).
64. See id. at 9.
65. Id. at 9.
66. See id. at 206.
67. 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992).
68. GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 112.
69. Id. at 115.
70. Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some
Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010).
71. Id.
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Whether Greenawalt’s discussion of this case involves genuine
irrationality or ipse dixit reasoning is a deep issue that I am addressing in
longer-format work.72 Here I raise two more immediate questions. First,
does the difficulty of Lee v. Weisman really suggest an impoverished
discourse, bereft of coherent foundations, or does it simply reflect a hard
case? It is interesting to consider whether theological treatments, which are
sometimes imagined to provide a firmer foundation for religious freedom
jurisprudence, would actually be any more straightforward in such a case.
Surely, at least some religious philosophies would care not just about the
desires of Christian students to solemnize their graduation ceremony, but
also about the concerns of students who identify with dissenting sects of
Christianity, other religions, or even nonbelieving orientations. Such
diversity among theologies, and complexity within them, are deemphasized
by general references to “traditional religion.”73 Has there ever existed a
historical period in which views were united about questions of the proper
relationship between religion and government? More likely, there have
always been hard cases, and always will be. If that is right, then their
persistence need not indicate a degenerate discourse.
Second, are hard cases really more prevalent in the area of religious
freedom, as compared to other constitutional domains governed by openended provisions like freedom of speech, equal protection, due process, the
Eighth Amendment, or the Fourth Amendment? To know for certain would
require a systematic, comparative study. Beginning a law review article
with the formula “the law of [area X] is in utter disarray” is as commonplace
in other areas of law as it is in this one, it seems. A possible conclusion is
that all of American constitutional doctrine is bankrupt—because overly
political, undemocratic, elitist, or unpredictable—but even if that were the
case it does little to support any particular impoverishment of religious
freedom doctrine because of specific internal or external developments.
So what exactly is at stake in claims that constitutional decision-making
on questions of religious freedom is doomed to achieve only modus vivendi
solutions but never principled ones? A close reading of Smith suggests three
more particular worries: that constitutional actors are biased in favor of

72. See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Constitutionalism (unpublished manuscript).
73. See, e.g., Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 919 (referring to “traditional religion”
and “traditional faiths”).
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outcomes that disfavor traditional religion,74 that they are elitist in the sense
of being disconnected from majoritarian beliefs,75 and that they will make
decisions that erode the rule of law because they are arbitrary.76 Those
charges deserve more detailed responses than I can give in this short essay.
But, again, it is worth considering whether they disproportionately
characterize religious freedom jurisprudence—as compared to other areas of
constitutional law—and whether any imagined jurisprudence, theological or
otherwise, could root them out. Social and political forces will work on
constitutional actors in this area just as they do in others, although of course
not in exactly the same way.77 Comparing those dynamics should shape our
research agendas.
***
Third and finally, there is the concern that American government is
being overtaken by an orthodoxy of liberal egalitarianism that will fail to
protect adherents of traditional religion. Here is how the argument runs:
because many traditional religions teach that their own beliefs are true, while
others are mistaken, they inevitably come into conflict with liberal
egalitarianism, which insists that government owes all its citizens equal
respect.78 Traditional religion and today’s liberalism therefore are seen to be
“fundamentally incompatible.”79
Opposition to orthodoxy is of course a central liberal tenet—perhaps the
central tenet—so the charge here is one of inconsistency as well as simple

74. See, e.g., Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 925–26 (noting that “flagrant
inconsistency” in court decisions displeases adherents of traditional religion in part because “they
often lose particular battles”). Elsewhere, Smith notes that Greenawalt’s ostensibly principled
method usually generates outcomes that favor the progressive side of the debate. See Smith,
Discourse, supra note 51, at 1890–91.
75. See Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1900. After noting that Washington, Jefferson, and
Lincoln all violated the rule against government pronouncements on religious truth, Smith asks
whether perhaps more recent history supports the rule: “But tradition is an evolving matter, and in
our more secular and diverse society, we understand that such expressions are divisive and
inappropriate. Don’t we? Well, actually, no: we don’t—not unless the ‘we’ is understood to refer to
a smaller and more select fellowship (like, say, devout readers of the New York Times?).” Id.
76. See, e.g., id. at 1871 (“What the tradition desperately needs, it seems, is . . . a careful,
systematic demonstration that controversies over religious freedom can actually be resolved through
‘reasoned analysis, as distinguished from rhetoric.’”) (internal citation omitted).
77. Smith and I largely agree on this point, to which I will return at the end of this Response.
78. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 921.
79. Id. at 919.
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injustice. It is also entirely familiar. It is a version of the classic question of
how liberal governments ought to treat illiberal citizens or communities.
Liberal theory has given answers, but the key issue here is not whether those
answers are convincing, but whether the actual practice of American
government is justifiable under any of them. Whatever the answer in theory,
according to Smith, traditional believers have reason to worry that liberal
orthodoxy has little room for them.80 Richard Garnett similarly believes
there is a real risk that political forces on the question of gay marriage will
come to view religious believers as minorities, and not the type of minorities
deserving of individual rights against the majority but as outliers whose
views are unworthy of respect.81
Are these fears justified? Has American liberalism become so muscular
that it actually has morphed into nearly its opposite—an intolerant form of
government that brooks no dissent? So far, it does not seem that anyone is
claiming that much. Rather, scholars are warning of that possibility, should
developments continue in the direction they have been moving.82 Certain
cases are troubling to them, such as CLS v. Martinez. John Inazu highlights
that case and argues for stronger protection for group pluralism out of a
skepticism for “state orthodoxy.”83 Yet he is not arguing that we have
reached that point.84 Countervailing cases such as Hosanna-Tabor are
comforting indicators to traditional believers that they will continue to be
protected, even when they engage in illiberal behavior, especially when
those decisions are unanimous.85 At worst, for people who worry about
liberal orthodoxy, the doctrine is in tension with itself.
80. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 923 (“Once secular egalitarianism is accepted
and entrenched as the prevailing orthodoxy, how much sympathy or toleration can [religious
believers] expect over the long run to receive from their new and puritanically egalitarian secular
masters?”).
81. Richard W. Garnett, Worth Worrying About? Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom,
COMMONWEAL (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:35 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/worth-worryingabout.
82. See infra notes 83–84, 93–101 and accompanying text.
83. John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014).
84. See id.
85. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 929–32 (addressing Hosanna-Tabor); cf. Inazu,
supra note 83, at 40–43 (discussing Hosanna-Tabor and arguing that the decision would have been
more firmly grounded in a general right to associate that would protect all groups, secular and
sacred).

977

[Vol. 41: 963, 2014]

The End of Religious Freedom
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Perhaps a more difficult area for traditional believers would be the
Establishment Clause, which seems to expressly disfavor public
endorsements of religious views even while governments remain free to
embrace secular or liberal perspectives.86 This disparity could be seen as
constitutional enforcement of secular orthodoxy in the context of
government expression. One response is that religion actually is not all that
exceptional in this regard.87 I have recently argued that in fact the
Constitution limits government endorsement of ideas not only with respect
to religion, but for other topics as well.88 Racialized speech and
electioneering, for example, are also prohibited, and several other
endorsements face similar constitutional restrictions grounded in various
provisions including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause,
and the Free Speech Clause itself. So religion is not singled out here:
government can still engage in much religious speech, and where it cannot
there often exist analogous secular barriers.
Another response is that the Court, if anything, seems to be moving in
the direction of allowing more religious speech by the government, not less.
In particular, the Justices have relied on standing doctrine to take the courts
out of the business of enforcing restrictions on government endorsement of
religion.89 At the moment, the Court seems poised to further weaken
nonestablishment barriers on government speech, now in the context of
legislative prayer.90 With the departure of Justice O’Connor, who was the
chief architect of the rule against religious endorsements,91 and with the
arrival in her stead of Justice Alito, who shows little affinity for that

86. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
87. See Tebbe, Nonendorsement, supra note 44, at 648–50.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (dismissing a
challenge to agency action promoting President Bush’s “faith-based initiatives” on standing
grounds); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing a challenge to
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools on standing grounds). See generally Steven D.
Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 (2011)
(embracing these decisions as embodiments of a salutary move toward “soft constitutionalism”).
90. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388
(2013).
91. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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principle,92 the Court may well move further in that direction, this time using
substantive doctrine rather than procedural mechanisms. So Establishment
Clause law, which might seem like a natural focus for concern over liberal
orthodoxy, actually cuts the other way.
Nevertheless, alarm bells over liberal dominance do seem to be
sounding more loudly and more frequently of late.93 Perhaps that is because
of a perception that the “culture wars” are coming to a close, and that
progressives have won. Two fronts of that conflict do seem to be moving
decisively against advocates for traditional religion. Rights for LGBT
people are coming to be recognized at a rapid rate, not only in the area of
marriage for same-sex couples, but somewhat more generally as well.94
Insistence on health insurance coverage for female contraceptives by the
Obama Administration is perhaps another indicator, although that fight is
only now reaching the Supreme Court.95 Increasing recognition for
nonbelievers has been cited as another area of advance for progressive
forces.96 As Smith says, however, it is far too soon for progressives to
declare victory.97 I have already mentioned Americans’ increasing tolerance
for government expression of religious ideas, and on topics like reproductive
freedom, the results are far more mixed.98 Still, there does seem to be a
sense among traditional religious believers that they have come to occupy a
minority position on several such questions.99
That sense does much to explain the recent prevalence of a discourse of
minority rights, antidiscrimination, and anti-orthodoxy among those
concerned with the plight of so-called traditional religions. Oftentimes, that
92. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 723, 728 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part)
(expressing skepticism about the “so-called ‘endorsement test’”).
93. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
94. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012) (describing the extraordinarily
rapid rise of the gay rights movement).
95. See Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
96. Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 419–20.
97. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 932 (noting that the debate “bids to continue for
some time to come”).
98. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for
Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 323–25
(2009).
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discourse deploys the language of religious freedom, yet just as often it
invokes universal guarantees such as free speech, equal citizenship, and
freedom of association in order to remind liberals and progressives that their
commitments to those principles should not only protect themselves when
they are in the minority, but also more traditional citizens when political
fortunes are reversed.100 This is not to say that warnings about liberal
orthodoxy are not sincere and powerful. Rather, the point is that this
language is exactly what you would expect to see in a constitutional
democracy when a group finds itself newly or differently embattled. Smith
is right to say that whether such arguments prevail will depend as much on
political and social dynamics as on their legal authority.101
***
Smith closes by predicting—albeit tentatively and conditionally—that
the fortunes of religious freedom as a legal doctrine will depend on the
fortunes of “the church” in politics and society.102 If and only if “the
church” continues to thrive in American society will religious freedom
continue to be protected vigorously.103 Many questions surround this claim,
including whether it makes sense to speak of “the church” when Christian
faiths proliferate, something Smith discusses;104 how other organized
religions fit into this conception; whether it might make more sense to link
the fortunes of religious freedom to the health and prevalence of religious
practice in America rather than to institutionalized faith; whether the new
prominence of nonbelievers weakens or strengthens religious freedom, and
so forth. Yet Smith’s fundamental argument is convincing—that the health
of religious freedom in constitutional practice will likely be closely linked to
the fortunes of religion in wider social and political dynamics.
Those dynamics include not only general demographic trends, such as
the percentage of Americans who affiliate with religious organizations or
who regularly attend worship services.105 They also feature perceptions of
100. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 920–21.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 128.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See generally, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW
RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 129 (2012) (demonstrating, inter alia, the increased disaffiliation
of Americans from organized religion, partly in response to the gay rights movement).
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religion and of religious freedom that emerge from controversies over
marriage between people of the same sex,106 equality of opportunity for
LGBT people in employment and schooling,107 health insurance coverage for
employees under the contraception mandate,108 exclusion from membership
by faith-based student groups on university campuses,109 and so forth.
Views on these disputes—and on the constitutional questions implicated in
them—will be influenced by grassroots religious groups, by the social
movement for LGBT rights, by media coverage, by positions taken by
political parties, by local and state governments, and of course by arguments
made in Congress and by executive branch officials including the President.
Outcomes of religious freedom disputes that make it to the courts will
depend in large measure on convictions formed in the context of these wider
political and social debates.
Yet the persuasiveness of this observation sits in some tension with
worry over the state of the doctrine.110 Will outcomes really turn on whether
constitutional actors continue to place religion in its own constitutional
category? Even if religion ceases to be special as a matter of constitutional
doctrine, there are plenty of legal resources that will continue to be available
to protect religious observance, as argued above.111 Social forces will drive
legal outcomes to a significant degree regardless of whether religion
106. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/politics/15marriage.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on the role of the Mormon Church in passing Proposition 8, the
ballot initiative that amended the California constitution to prohibit marriage between people of the
same sex).
107. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, For Young People, Transgender Life Means Stress and
Confusion over Restrooms, Sports and Harassment, ABA J., Oct. 2013, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_gender_change_at_a_tender_age/
(reporting
on
religious freedom challenges to a Massachusetts law that protects transgender people in employment
and education).
108. At present, the leading examples, of course, are the challenges by for-profit corporations to
the regulation requiring them to provide health insurance coverage for contraception. Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013);
Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 678 (2013).
109. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding a decision
by a public university to deny official recognition to a Christian student group that excluded
members who did not adhere to its policies on sexual morality).
110. See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text.
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continues to be viewed as constitutionally special. To be sure, doctrinal and
social developments likely will move together, so that decline in the
specialness of religion will accompany decline of social regard for religion.
That seems to be Smith’s point at the end, and it is well taken. But that
argument also calls into question whether lawyerly and academic arguments
against the constitutional specialness of religion are the primary drivers of
actual outcomes in legal disputes.
Similar questions surround claims about the confusions and
contradictions of religious freedom doctrine.112 If social and political
influences are largely responsible for the broad pattern of outcomes in court
cases, then we should be less concerned about the state of the doctrine,
except as a symptom of those broader dynamics. Confused holdings will not
necessarily herald weaker protection for religious actors. That is not to say
that legal arguments about the meaning of the Constitution have no influence
on politics and society. Causation works in both directions. But mutual
influence is a matter of degree, and if Smith is right that the principal causes
are extralegal, then the stakes of debates over doctrinal matters—such as the
specialness of religion or the weakness of constitutional rules as
predictors—could be low.
My conclusion is not that debates over constitutional theory and
political morality do not matter—again, low stakes is not the same as no
stakes—but instead that they have limited impact on outcomes. Concerns
over the health of religious freedom as a concept may well resonate with
broader conversations that Americans are having in the context of specific
cases like the constitutionality of the contraception mandate or the impact of
same-sex marriage on communities of faith. However, component concerns
over the specialness of religion or the muddled state of the doctrine may turn
out to be, if not entirely epiphenomenal, then weak influences on the fate of
the concept of religious freedom among Americans.

112.

982

See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text.

